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THE MARKET FOR JUSTICE, THE “LITIGATION EXPLOSION,” AND THE “VERDICT
BUBBLE”: A CLOSER LOOK AT VANISHING TRIALS
By Frederic N. Smalkin* and Frederic N.C. Smalkin **
“A jury consists of twelve persons chosen to decide who has the better lawyer.” – Robert Frost
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Abstract
[a.1] Recently, a respected jurist has lamented the declining number of federal jury trials. Chief Judge William
Young of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, writing in the Federal Lawyer,1
pointed out that jury trials in federal civil cases declined 26% in the decade between 1989 and 1999, which he
attributed to four factors: the district court judiciary’s “loss of focus” on the core function of trying jury cases;
the business community’s loss of interest in jury adjudication (“opting out of the legal system altogether” in
favor of arbitration); Congress’s “marginalizing the district court judiciary”; and the “Europeanization of
American Law,” which seems to refer to the expanding role of administrative adjudication in American law.2

The Jury’s In
Judicial Economics
The Jury’s Out
The Verdict

[a.2] In our view, although Judge Young has correctly observed that the data show a decline in the number of
completed federal civil jury trials,3 and has also given some explanations for the numbers, he did not give
sufficient credit to a major, underlying issue, which involves the economics of adjudication, beyond the
business community’s “loss of interest” in jury trials. We shall demonstrate that there is a marked increase in
the use of alternative fora, especially arbitration, which is inevitably drawing down the number of cases that
would otherwise be filed, as well as those eventually reaching trial. Although the decline in trials has come
both in trials concluded before judges and juries, arbitration, as Young recognizes, has a special role in
displacing jury trials, as it offers a more predictable and far less expensive dispute resolution mechanism than
is provided by trial of facts to a randomly selected, broadly representative jury panel.
[a.3] We shall also demonstrate that legal history teaches that there has long been market competition among
alternative fora; that fora, as well as litigants, are themselves motivated by economic considerations that make
them more (or less) willing to exercise jurisdiction; and that dispute resolution will tend, over time, to move
toward the most economically efficient forum. Although increased judicial “activism,” e.g., increased
enthusiasm for resolving cases by summary judgment, has been identified as a major culprit in the diversion of
cases from trial,4 rather little attention seems to have been paid to the role of jury verdicts – especially high-end
“outliers” – as a factor in the shrinking numbers of trials.
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The data actually show a steady decline in both jury and nonjury federal civil trials. See Table I
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The Numbers
[1] As observed by Judge Young, the number of federal civil jury trials5 showed a remarkable
decline of more than one-fourth in the decade 1989-99.6 The authors have brought the numbers up
to date, through fiscal year 2002. The decline has continued, as Table I below clearly demonstrates:
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As reported on a fiscal-year basis by the ADMIN . OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, Appendix: Detailed
Statistical Tables, tbls. C-4, C-4a, and C-7 for fiscal years 1997-2002.
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The number of civil filings has, in contrast, showed remarkably little fluctuation from 1993
through 2002. The figures are: 1993-226,165; 1994-236,391; 1995-248,335; 1996-269,132; 1997272,027; 1998-256,787; 1999-260,271; 2000-259,517; 2001-250,907; 2002-274,841. See id. at tbls.
C. These figures readily lend themselves to a conclusion that many cases are simply not filed in the
Article III forum in the first place, because, given a growing population (both in the general
population and in the ranks of lawyers) and significant yearly increases in statutory civil remedies
from new legislation without offsetting repeal of older remedies, one would expect a substantial
increase in the number of filings over the years rather than a plateau.
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[2] It is interesting to note from Table I that the decline in completed trials is not confined to jury
trials, but extends to completed trials, both jury and nonjury, which correlate with an r2 of 0.99.7
This decline in total trials of both sorts is addressed neither by Young nor by much recent literature
disparaging what is seen as judicial aversion to the jury; this is omitted for an important reason,
explained below.
[3] It is illuminating to look to at least one major alternative to the federal trial – jury or nonjury –
and that is the number of arbitrations instituted with the American Arbitration Association, set forth
below in Table II:

[4] A simple comparison shows that while the number of federal trials has been decreasing
markedly, the number of arbitrations has been increasing markedly. Unfortunately, the limited
nature of the data precludes a more statistically robust analysis of the correlation between jury trials
and ADR Nevertheless, these obvious trends beget the questions: Where has the litigation gone,

7

The Administrative Office reports from which Table I is compiled do not separately report trials
conducted by Magistrate Judges. Interestingly, the numbers of jury and non-jury trials conducted
by Magistrate Judges, with consent of the litigants, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), show a decline from
highs of 892 and 656, respectively, in 1998 to 472 and 487, respectively, in 2002, as reported in
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 5, at Table S-17.
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and is there good reason to suspect migration out of the judicial forum in favor of others, like
arbitration, rather than simply natural growth in the number of arbitrations.
[5] Four possible answers suggest themselves, but can be dispatched without lengthy discussion.
The first is that people are becoming generally less litigious. However, the number of federal civil
filings has seen no significant decline over the relevant time period.8 One might next assume that
the number of trials completed has declined simply because federal civil trials are getting postponed
more often than in the past and untried civil cases are simply accumulating, while judges do other
things, like deal with a burgeoning criminal caseload. This was also investigated by the authors, but
was found not to be the case, as the reported statistics show only a 2.8% increase in median time
from filing to trial in civil cases between 1997 and 2002.9 A third possible answer is that cases filed
recently are somehow systematically less “deserving” of trial, in some objective sense. However,
there is little reason to believe that this is the case, even if such an assessment of relative merit could
be made. Lastly, one might assume that these cases are being litigated in other judicial fora, but
there is mounting evidence that jury trials in state court are systematically decreasing as well.10
[6] Some would argue that a shift to arbitration is primarily or entirely the product of increased
disparate bargaining power at the forum choice point, which is often at the time of contracting.11
But a few observations contraindicate unilateral imposition as the most likely explanation of these
trends. First, arbitration clauses are not universal enough to have the kind of impact seen in these
figures. Second, while there has been much argument in favor of enforcing such forum choice
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ADMIN . OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURT – JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE
(2002). See also ERIK MOLLER , RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS
SINCE 1985, tbl. 2 (1996) (showing declines in jury trials from 1985-94 in eleven of fifteen states
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There is some evidence that there has been a decline in cases going to trial in at least some state
courts, as well. In December, 2003, the American Bar Association’s Section of Litigation’s Civil
Justice Initiative sponsored a conference called “Vanishing Trials,” prompted by the observation that
“[d]uring the last 15 years a federal court trend that has been mirrored in many states is the drastic
decline in the number of cases tried to verdict.” ABA Communiqué, October 2003. The thoughtful
papers presented at the Litigation Task Force Conference by, among others, Professors Galanter and
Resnik can be found collected in Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD .
459 (2004).
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Judge Young specifically identifies the federal courts’ strong deference to arbitration as a culprit
in the jury’s demise, as reflected in federal judges’ “expansive reading” of the Federal Arbitration
Act. He also calls for amendment of that Act to return it to what he sees as its original, limited
purposes: “expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act allows the unilateral imposition of
arbitration clauses to trump all sorts of civil rights and consumer protection legislation.” Young,
supra note 1, at 33.
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clauses, they are still subject to nullification as contracts of adhesion and may be defeated under the
minimum contacts test,12 placing their efficacy in doubt. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this
hypothesis with the fact that federal civil filings have not been decreasing overall.13 This
combination indicates that whatever primarily lies behind the decline in trials is a result of choices
made after the events giving rise to a claim.
[7] An explanation that appears to some to be intuitive is that judges are to blame. Some would
argue that judges are intentionally discriminating against juries. In that case, we should expect to
see a more distinct decline in jury trials, as compared to bench trials.14 Yet, as noted above, the
decline in both jury and non-jury trials correlates almost perfectly. Alternatively, the decline has
been attributed to a crushing federal workload, mainly due to increased criminal prosecutions.
However, new judgeships are added each year to keep up with the volume of cases (sixteen in
2003),15 and in any event, this explanation does not address the surge in ADR seen in the last few
years.
[8] A reliable indicator of trends affecting litigation is the proverbial man on the street, or, in our
case, the lawyer at the water-cooler. Anyone who spends more than a few minutes standing by a
law firm water-cooler will conclude, based on litigators’ focus on “the twin v’s” venue and venire,
that a major strategic concern is the composition of the jury. Pretrial rulings on these issues will
have an overriding impact on parties’ willingness to settle, rather than proceed to trial.
[9] Even if limitations imposed by the nature of the reported data preclude demonstrating, with
robust statistical significance, a direct causal relationship between declining federal trials and
increasing arbitrations, arbitration is, at the very least, perceived as an attractive alternative forum
by both those with disputes, who increasingly seek it, and at least one respected and experienced
member of the federal judiciary, viz., Chief Judge Young.

12

International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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In fact, since there has not been shown an overall increase in litigiousness, an increase in
arbitrations without a corresponding increase in civil filings would indicate that, contrary to
Professor Miller’s argument, binding arbitration clauses are actually increasing public access to
justice. This follows from potential plaintiffs’ apprehension of initiating formal proceedings in
Federal or State courts.
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The implicit argument here is that the judge could affect the selection of jury vs. bench trial, and
there is good reason to support this. Judges, including magistrate judges, are instrumental in
structuring litigation and even the disposition of cases by settlement, and can thereby influence the
parties to select one form of trial over another.

15

Twenty-First Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107273, § 312, 116 Stat. 1758, 1786 (2002) (creating eight temporary and eight permanent district
judgeships).
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[10] It just may be that judges are guilty of professional narrow-mindedness, but not the kind
envisioned by Professor Miller and others. In other words, they are not shirking their
responsibilities by denying parties their day in court, but are failing to recognize the attractiveness
of alternative fora and the implications this has for the judiciary.
[11] These observations lead us to suggest that fora can and do compete in the market for litigation,
and that litigation will tend to move, in obedience to ordinary market forces, to the least-cost forum,
irrespective of party advantage. This paper attempts to describe the mechanism through which juries
systematically increase uncertainty and thereby impose costs on both sides, driving litigation not just
away from the courts by settlements, but to alternative fora that are increasingly attractive to both
plaintiffs and defendants.
[12] These trends are only keenly seen over time; trials declined for years before people started
widespread discussion of the phenomenon. Phenomena that occur over time constitute a story. We
therefore begin as any good story should – long, long ago.
A Lesson from Legal History
[13] To a large extent, the history of the development of the legal system of England from the time
of the Norman Conquest through the end of the eighteenth century is the story of evolving notions
of jurisdiction (in the sense of a forum’s willingness to entertain a case, assuming it has the power
to do so). This evolution was powered by the interacting self-interests of fora and litigants.
[14] By the fifteenth century, the jurisdictions of the two superior national courts of England, within
bounds set by Magna Carta,16 had become fairly well settled by tradition and usage: King’s Bench
had jurisdiction over matters in which the Crown had an interest, while Common Pleas handled
private disputes.17 Until the Crown fell into the hands of the Tudors at the end of the War of the
Roses, the King’s Bench was not a busy court, as compared to Common Pleas: “Its records filled
only a few hundred skins a year, whereas those of Common Pleas filled a thousand or two.”18
During the fifteenth century, both of the superior courts experienced a migration of litigation to
alternative fora, i.e., the King’s Council and Chancery, where business was taken by “common
lawyers, who resorted to them because of the attraction of their relative informality, the ease with
which defendants could be arrested, and the inquisitorial method of investigation which bypassed
the sheriff and the jury.”19
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MAGNA CARTA , cls. 17-18 (1215).
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J.H. BAKER , AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 38 (4th ed. 2002).
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Id.
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Id. at 40.
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[15] Their “initial success was perceived as a threat to the business of the common-law courts.”20
This loss of judicial business principally impacted the King’s Bench, which reacted by developing
“swift process and procedure to vie with that of the Chancery, and acquired a jurisdiction over most
common pleas by a combination of procedural devices.”21 This did not sit well with Common Pleas,
resulting in the “legal disputes of the later sixteenth century [which] took on the appearance of an
internecine struggle for business between the common-law courts themselves.”22 Although the
personnel of King’s Bench had a personal stake “in furthering this amplification of their jurisdiction,
they were at the same time meeting strong popular demand.”23 The key point for the present
analysis is that “popular demand” was Adam Smith’s invisible hand, quietly guiding disputes into
the forum where they could be resolved at least cost (risk being a form of cost): “The principal
competitors were not the judges or officers [of the courts] themselves but the litigants and their
lawyers, shopping for the most advantageous forum.”24
[16] King’s Bench, in particular, went to lengths in order to attract more business. In the sixteenth
century, King’s Bench “wooed litigants with competitive costs, and sometimes even lowered its fees
in order to increase the overall takings,”25 a universal practice of the volume seller. Jurisdictional
expansion was accomplished by a device labeled the “bill of Middlesex,” which got around
cumbersome, older mechanisms for acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant’s person by alleging
a fictional trespass occurring in the County of Middlesex, where King’s Bench sat. There would be
an allegation that the defendant had trespassed against the plaintiff in Hendon, and “[i]t mattered
not whether the plaintiff or defendant had ever set foot in Hendon, or even Middlesex.” The
fictional trespass would simply be disregarded, while the dispute proceeded to be resolved on its
merits according to the common law, whether in trespass or in debt or detinue. The net effect of all
this was to increase the business of the King’s Bench by a factor of ten between 1560 and 1640.26
This increase was clearly the result of competitive behavior on the part of King’s Bench, which “had
no monopoly, and . . . thrived only by satisfying litigants and the profession at large.”27
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 41.
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Id. (Although, perhaps “actors” or “determinants” would have been a more apt term than
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Id. at 42.
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Id. at 43.

27

Id. at 44.
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[17] Although Common Pleas attempted to meet the competition, it was bound to the ancient,
cumbersome writ procedure for acquiring jurisdiction, and it could not resort to any fiction as
convenient as the Bill of Middlesex. Furthermore, it was not economically competitive, as “it failed
to make substantial reductions in its own scale of costs, allegedly because the three prothonotaries
could never reach agreement on any specific proposal for the cuts.”28 The Common Pleas did not
see an overall diminution in its caseload, as there was an overall increase in litigation during this
period. Common Pleas’ bar was ten times larger than that of King’s Bench, and it included a
substantial number of attorneys who practiced throughout the country, rather than simply at
Westminster.29 Thus, “the business of the Common Pleas increased considerably during the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, albeit at a slower rate than that of the King’s Bench.”30
[18] Interestingly, the end of the King’s Bench-Common Pleas competition was accomplished both
by legislation in 1661 designed to cut back on King’s Bench’s jurisdictional fictions31 and by
Common Pleas’ own adoption of a jurisdiction-enhancing fiction in 1675.32
[19] Why did these courts compete with each other for business in the first place throughout the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? Other than professional pride and prejudice, the most
compelling motivation was the compensation of judges and other court officers. It was not until
much later that the concept of English judicial and quasi-judicial office as a property right to be held
in freehold,33 capable of being bought and sold, died out; remuneration of the judge in the form of
fees34 was not replaced by a stated annual salary until 1826.35 In the period of intense jurisdictional
competition discussed above, put simply, more litigation meant more money lining the judicial robe.
The courts were acting, in large part, out of selfish economic considerations when establishing their
jurisdictions and setting their procedures.36
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Vexatious Arrests and Delays at Law Act, 1661, 13 CAR . 2, s. 2, c. 2.
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BAKER , supra note 17, at 47.
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Id. at 112; see also D.L. KEIR , THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485,
at 390 (9th ed. 1969).
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Sometimes, the fees, especially in Chancery, could be enormously lucrative. See BAKER , supra
note 17, at 112.
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KEIR , supra note 34, at 390.
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For a collection of other authorities commenting on judges’ fees as a jurisdictional factor, see
(continued...)
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[20] Interestingly, friction between the arbitral forum itself and the common law courts from
economic competition can be traced back to the same period of inter-judicial competition addressed
above. The great legal historian and Chancellor Lord Campbell observed:
There was no disguising the fact that, as formerly, the emoluments of
the Judges depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as
they had no fixed salaries, there was great competition to get as much
as possible of litigation into Westminster Hall for the division of the
spoil . . . . And they had great jealousy of arbitrations whereby
Westminster Hall was robbed of those cases which came not into
Kings Bench, nor the Common Pleas, nor the Exchequer. Therefore
they said that the courts ought not to be ousted of their jurisdiction,
and that it was contrary to the policy of the law to do so. That really
grew up only subsequently to the time of Lord Coke, and a saying of
his was the foundation of the doctrine.37
The Jury’s In
[21] The archetypal Anglo-American dispute resolution mechanism is, of course, the trial of issues
of fact before the jury.38 Juries in English law predate the Norman Conquest. Over many centuries,
and for a number of reasons, the jury’s character underwent a remarkable change. With small
license, the modern jury can conveniently be thought of as having evolved markedly from its
ancestor, a group of locals essentially called as witnesses and sworn to speak the true facts as they
knew them to the King’s justices, as those justices came to the shires from the seat of government
to extend the King’s writ and to exercise his judicial power. During the fourteenth century, the jury
gradually was transformed into a more neutral body of fact-finders, who were not expected to have
first-hand knowledge of the disputants or their dispute. Judges exercised tremendous control over
juries, and could even attaint them for a false verdict.39 Except for this element of judicial control,

36

(...continued)
Kulukundis Shipping Co. S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 n.16 (2d Cir. 1942).
37

Id. at 983 n.14 (quoting Scott v. Avery, 25 L.J.Ex. 308, 313 (1856)). In Kulukundis, Judge Frank,
writing for the Court, famously quipped about the doctrine under discussion: “Give a bad dogma a
good name and its bite may become as bad as its bark.” Id. at 983.
38

The discussion in the accompanying text is drawn primarily from BAKER , supra note 17, at 72-75.

39

BAKER , supra note 17, at 136. Service on a mediaeval jury could be extremely unpleasant, and
modern jurors who object to serving could properly be reminded of the ancient rigors:
After their charge, the jurors were confined “without meat, drink, fire
or candle,” or conversation with others, until they were agreed; and
(continued...)
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the modern American jury has not changed much in its basic role in the legal process from its Tudor
ancestor to the present, though, as will be shown, it has changed markedly in its composition and
– at least in England – its utilization.
[22] The English civil jury, ancestor of America’s, has fallen into almost complete desuetude, with
what, in historical perspective, has been remarkable swiftness. It started with the enactment of the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854,40 enabling the parties to consent to fact-finding by the judge,
as “[a]ll the experience suggested that judges were more likely to understand the factual issues than
laymen, and were as competent to assess evidence.”41 The decline was not only swift, it was broad:
In the course of the twentieth century, however, the alternative of
jury trial more or less disappeared. The very existence of an option
made the decision to ask for a jury suspicious: it suggested the hope
of confusion in a weak case, or the expectation of exorbitant damages
in cases involving distressing details or high feelings. . . . Since 1933
parties have been allowed juries only with leave of court, except in
cases of libel and a few other matters; and the courts have indicated
their unwillingness to give such leave.42
[23] These developments are all the more remarkable because they took place without legislation,
by the common consent of the participants in the English public adjudication market, primarily

39

(...continued)
if they could not agree they were supposed to be carried round the
circuit in a cart until they did. The merest suspicion of misbehaviour
was punishable, and we read of Tudor jurors being fined for eating
sweets.

The accompanying footnote reports that, “In 1587, four jurors were fined merely for being in
possession of raisins and plums.” Id. at note 19, at 75.
40

17 & 18 Vict., c.125.

41

BAKER , supra note 17, at 92.

42

Id. Although juries are still used in serious criminal cases in England, the Blair Government tried
as recently as July, 2003, to do away with them in a range of complex and difficult cases. The
Government’s proposal was effectively defeated in the House of Lords. See House of Lords
Overturns Government Plan to End Trial by Jury for Complex Fraud Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 16, 2003. This led to one of the more interesting legal observations of all time. The Home
Office Minister, Baroness Scotland, QC, was quoted as having told ITV News, in reaction to the
Lords’ decision, that the abolition of jury trials as sought by the Government was a “real reform.
We’re allowing the guilty really to have an opportunity to be found guilty.” Andrew Pierce, The
Lords, TIMES (London), July 17, 2003, at 6.
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English lawyers (who have been historically precluded from taking cases on a contingent fee basis).
In short, the market for civil jury trials in England simply dried up.
[24] American federal courts, of course, do not enjoy the ability of their English cousins simply to
dispense with the civil jury as unreliable or outmoded. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
guarantees most federal civil litigants43 a jury trial when the enormous sum of twenty dollars is in
controversy,44 and many state constitutions provide similar guarantees.
[25] The jury of the Seventh Amendment’s Age of Enlightenment and the modern civil trial jury are,
however, two very different institutions. Again, history is instructive.
[26] Alexis de Tocqueville praised the common-law jury of his age, calling it “as direct and extreme
consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage.”45 Of course, it is well known
that suffrage in America at the time of de Tocqueville was far from universal; indeed, it was not
until much later that traditionally excluded groups (women of all races and African-Americans)
gained the right to vote.46 And what of juries? Were they, in de Tocqueville’s day, as far from
representative of the general population as was the electorate? Surprisingly, at least in the federal
courts, they were, and, more surprisingly, they remained so until well into the latter half of the

43

A noteworthy exception is a claim against the United States Government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2401 et seq. Oddly enough, it seems that in waiving sovereign
immunity for claims against the federal government, Congress did not repose sufficient trust in the
jury system to grant claimants against the government the right to a jury trial. In such cases, judges
are the fact-finders on all issues, including damages. The same is true of actions against foreign
states removed to federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). For an interesting discussion of
the constitutionality of the immunity from jury trial given foreign states, see In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932, 945-47 (7th Cir. 1996).

44

Trial by jury is available under the Seventh Amendment when, judging by common law standards
as of 1791, the claim is legal, rather than equitable, in nature, and the defendant is suable at law,
again under 1791 standards. See In re Air Crash Disaster, supra note 44. This produces the
deliciously ironic result that, although the common law of England has essentially abandoned the
civil jury trial, see note 43, supra, England’s former colonies (at least as a federal body) are forever
stuck in the eighteenth century as to their obligation to give civil litigants a jury trial. The Seventh
Amendment’s guarantee of a civil jury trial has historically been viewed as not binding on the
States, see Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876), although recent “revisionist” academic
thought about the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause takes a differing view. See David
Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 335 (2003).

45

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 29 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans.,
A.A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
46

U.S. CONST. amends. XV and XIX, ratified in 1870 and 1920, respectively.
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twentieth century. Indeed, it has been said that “Eighteenth-century juries were . . . ‘the Rotarians
of their day.’”47
[27] The procedure for assembling a jury venire in the federal district courts was not made uniform
throughout the country until enactment of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968.48 Before that
Act, most federal juries were selected by the “key man”49 system. The chief judge of the District
selected a “key man” who would assemble a venire for a term of court, calling upon individuals
personally known or recommended to him who would make “good” jurors, in his estimation. From
this venire, the petit juries were empanelled at trial, after voir dire conducted by the trial judge. As
the legislative history of the 1968 Act so eloquently understated it, “Often the [key man] system
results in under representation of craftsmen, service workers, and laborers as compared with the
professional and managerial classes.”50 In fact, the federal trial jury known to the previous
generation of lawyers was a select jury.
[28] Surprisingly little is said in general English legal history texts about the method of jury
selection at common law.51 We do know, however, that sheriffs of the counties played the key role
in jury selection. For example, in the course of discussing the general state of political and legal
corruption in the fifteenth century, one distinguished scholar noted, “[T]he sheriffs were the tools
of greater men, and, through their power over juries, the law of the country was at their mercy.”52
The so-called gentleman jury, impaneled by the sheriff for important cases, was limited by law to
gentlemen of what for the time was substantial wealth (“men of quality”) and, in some cases,
required a venire to be assembled from those “legally entitled to be called esquire, or a person of
high decree [sic], such as a banker, merchant, or the head of a dwelling rated at not less than onehundred pounds in a town of 20,000 or fifty pounds elsewhere.”53

47

Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 33, 57 (1990) (quoting Professor Morris S. Arnold).
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28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1867.
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The gender reference in this term is most likely inadvertently reflective of the reality.
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H.R. REP. NO . 90-1076, at 4 n.1 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1792, 1794 n.1.

51

For example, there is no discussion of the mechanics of jury selection in the works of Baker or
Keir cited in notes 17 and 34, supra.
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J.E.A. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
SETTLEMENT TO 1485, at 417 (4th ed. 1961).
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Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling for Professional
Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC . 1, 9 (1998).
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[29] The “gentleman jury,” moreover, was only one type of jury, and none of the others was very
different in terms of its lack of inclusiveness:
Four types of special juries existed in common law England. The
first type, the gentleman jury, consisted of men of high social or
economic status. The second type, the struck jury, was selected upon
the demand of either party and consisted of principal landowners
selected from a list of forty-eight names. The third type, the
professional jury, had members who possessed special knowledge or
expertise. The fourth and most unique type, the party jury, attempted
to ensure a foreign defendant of fairness by encompassing only
individuals who were the same race, sex, or origin as the defendant.54
[30] Of course, the “key man” system utilized in federal practice until the late 1960s did not differ
much in terms of its product from the subjective selection processes noted above and no doubt
familiar to those who drafted the Seventh Amendment.55 And the practice was not much different
in most state courts, select juries yielding only over time to those chosen, as today, from the
populace at large (or some segment thereof, such as registered voters), more or less at random.56
The present, randomly-selected and minimally qualified (i.e., meeting only criteria such as having
a driver’s license or being registered to vote) jury may be labeled the “modern” jury.
Judicial Economics
[31] Of course, judges are no longer remunerated by fees (or, one hopes, in bribes),57 but are paid
a stated salary, no matter how much or how little judicial business comes before them. Thus, they
no longer have any financial motive to increase the judicial business of the courts on which they
serve; rather, if there is too much judicial business, there may be an incentive to decrease it.58 As
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discussed above, it has been suggested that judges are selfishly abandoning their duties, for example,
by unjustifiably granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment.59 But an examination of their
actions alone is misdirected, though understandable. It is quite natural to conclude that judges will
do what they can to avoid the hard work of conducting trials, but it is not a lack of judges’ services
(supply) that is shifting the market to ADR. In fact, the shortfall is in demand for the ultimate
exercise of judicial authority – the trial – which can spring only from the population of litigants.
[32] Much has been written addressing the rising costs of litigation, most of which focuses on the
cost and delay associated with a modern jury trial of the facts.60 Time has always been equated with
money, as the old saying bears witness, and the delay and added work associated with the jury trial
burden both sides.
[33] The burgeoning role of jury experts61 points us to the crux of the topic at hand. Any lawyer has
some conception of his ideal jury panel, but jury consulting firms go far beyond the practitioner’s
common sense and employ professional psychologists and sociologists. Why would a litigant add
so drastically to litigation costs, when already faced with mounting expenditures? The answer lies
in the existence and perception of risk in today’s jury system.
[34] As history demonstrates, there is a market in dispute resolution, and there is no reason to think
it behaves any differently from other markets. In today’s adjudication market, economists have
identified as a driving force the implicit cost of the jury – the risk that comes from the jury’s
uncertainty of outcome.62 Modern market theory, well established and accepted in the field of
economics, tells us that bearing risk63 is work, just like any other, and is compensated as such. We
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assume this has not been central to much previous legal analysis because the relevant economic
literature is fairly recent, and the factors involved are not explicit costs in classic economic theory.
[35] All legal professionals have been exposed to the concept of bearing risk as work, although they
may not be aware of it. It is common knowledge that plaintiffs’ lawyers seek to maximize fees,
taking advantage of the so-called “American rule” that tolerates contingency payments that are often
quite large. Their size is justified (and accepted by even those who stand in moral opposition to
what they do) because these lawyers are not guaranteed payment in every case. But that is only half
the story; the key here is that their higher fees are justified not only with regard to individual cases,
but over their entire careers, because aside from being lawyers, they are also in the business of being
small banks that finance litigation. They are entitled to a sort of interest payment that defense
attorneys do not charge, because the latter do not carry risk.
[36] Once assessed, risk can be divided into two kinds, “systemic” and “idiosyncratic.” These
categories of risk can be applied to the judicial system if we consider the payoff from a case –
whether it be an award or the avoidance thereof – as a sort of legal “security.”64
[37] The behavior of the securities market has been the subject of considerable study. In that
market, idiosyncratic risk describes uncertainties associated with a particular security. In law,
idiosyncratic risk would be the unknowns of an individual case, such as a client’s information not
divulged to counsel or uncertainty of outcome. (Indeed, a certain amount of risk is necessary to
have a live case or controversy, the risk being uncertainty about the applicable law or the facts.) In
theory, idiosyncratic risk can be minimized by diversification. For example, a plaintiff’s lawyer
who takes, on a contingency basis, a large number of cases might typically charge a smaller
percentage than another plaintiff’s lawyer who only pursues a small number of large cases. A useful
analogy would be to compare a bank with a large volume of small loans to a venture capital firm that
has a small number of very large loans.
[38] In contrast, systemic risk applies to variables that affect multiple securities and those securities’
collective response. Having factored out idiosyncratic risk, evaluating systemic risk allows careful
investors to choose precisely the amount of risk they wish to bear and, accordingly, the
compensation they wish to receive. Investing is again illustrative, as in the simple case of bonds
versus stocks. An investor with a long time horizon would choose a diversified portfolio of stocks,
which are far riskier in the short-term, but bring higher reward in the long-term. Nearing retirement,
the investor would move her money into bonds, giving up remuneration, but lowering her risk. This
phenomenon is reflected in the practice of law; it is generally true that those who practice in the less
predictable areas of the law (such as plaintiffs’ tort work) ask an accordingly higher compensation,
usually in the form of a contingency fee that can run into the millions, as opposed to an hourly fee
or “value billing.” But, salient legal risk depends not only on the merits or circumstances of an
individual case, or even its general type, but also on the forum that entertains it. If we think of the
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courts as stocks, and ADR as bonds, the modern jury brings systemic risk – especially from high-end
outlier verdicts – to the courts. Hence, the careful investor, in our case, the prudent lawyer, can
maximize gains or minimize losses by choosing one dispute resolution mechanism over the other.
[39] As mentioned above, there is evidence that it was the self-interest of litigants and their attorneys
that dictated forum choice in the Tudor through Stuart periods.65 Self-interest, as a basic motivator
of human behavior, of course, cannot be expected to have disappeared or diminished appreciably
in the few hundred years since the jurisdictional wars of the English courts came to an end. If a
litigant has the power to maneuver the resolution of a dispute into a forum perceived as more
advantageous to him – whether from the standpoint of exposure to unpredictable high outlier
verdicts, speed and cost of adjudication, or other factors – both common sense and microeconomic
theory66 suggest that he will do so,67 as, for example, by inserting a binding arbitration clause or
other sort of forum selection clause (e.g., home-state federal court only) in a contract. And, of
course, those same fundamental forces suggest that, if both sides perceive the advantage of one
forum over another, their behavior will demonstrate mutual accord, even if no agreement on dispute
resolution was reached in a particular case ex ante.
[40] Estimations of a forum’s cost have various roots and take various forms. There are some
obvious factors that will influence litigants. For example, defense lawyers quite naturally and
correctly perceive that a judge is less likely to award a huge amount of damages (especially for noneconomic injury or punitive damages) than a jury (yet, there are data showing that plaintiffs have
a higher mean success rate in a number of categories of cases, in terms of win/loss, not of damage
award size, when a judge is the fact-finder).68 One should note, though, that alternative dispute
resolution does not always (or necessarily) benefit the defendant alone. For example, the speed and
low cost with which arbitration can settle a dispute may work in favor of the plaintiff’s attorney who
handles a large volume of cases and/or is underwriting costs for an impecunious clientele.
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[41] Although there are arguably many possible costs and benefits that might steer either side
towards a particular forum, economic analysis demonstrates that the observed drift away from the
jury is the product of a mutual decision. Recent articles have shown that parties on both sides of a
case will seek to avoid an unpredictable verdict. 69 Furthermore, the Coase Theorem70 states that
actors will seek efficiency by cooperating to divide the surplus created by adding value or, as this
paper proposes, eliminating waste. If the only alternative is settlement, then parties will be induced
to settle. However, if there is some value to be had in bringing a dispute before a third party, then,
where ADR is available, parties will seek it instead of trial. Thus, so long as both sides perceive that
they can get “justice,” and if it can be had at a lower cost, the dispute-resolution process will migrate
to the least expensive alternative.
[42] In short, the variability of jury awards – especially the “outlier” verdicts at the upper extreme
– tends to make the system economically inefficient, and this inefficiency creates excess profits and
costs. Returning to our earlier question, and as an example, one such cost is the fee of the jury
consultant, who is hired in an attempt to reduce the variance introduced by the jury. The money that
a defendant’s jury consultant is paid can be thought of as a slice of the “pure profit pie” that the
plaintiff’s lawyer might receive, were the consultants not able to advise their client to select a jury
that minimizes the risk of an outlier verdict.
The Jury’s Out
[43] Of course, despite popular sentiment, there is not universal agreement that very high outlier
verdicts or even a “litigation explosion” actually exist to a significant extent. In fact, Professor
Arthur Miller, in an article cited earlier in this work,71 rests a large part of his argument against the
overzealous grant of summary judgment on his perception that there has been no “litigation
explosion.”72 He argues that, overall, the number of cases filed is not growing disproportionately
to the population. He also downplays a perceived rising tide in jury damage awards: “[A] RAND
Institute of Civil Justice study finding that mean jury verdicts increased in Cook County and San
Francisco…found that the median jury verdict figures, when certain procedural changes in San
Francisco were accounted for, actually remained ‘strikingly stable’ over the twenty-five-year
period.”73 An increase, however, in the mean – but not the median – most likely reflects an
increasing incidence of high-end outlying verdicts. That is, it is reasonable to conclude that, as the
high-end awards move higher, the variance in awards – and therefore risk – increases, because there
is no reason to believe that, over the span of time studied, the bulk of verdicts became more
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concentrated around the median. Even those who might doubt that the empirical evidence for
variance substantiates perceptions of variance adduced by anecdotal evidence do not doubt the
reality of the perceptions themselves and their effect on the vanishing jury trial.74
[44] In short, drastic unpredictability inheres in the power of the jury (above and beyond its basic
determination of a verdict on liability – a process which itself has come under academic scrutiny75)
to fix damage awards, as it sees fit, with limited review, and with reversal only in the most
egregious cases, and even then, not often. The jury can be seen as a sort of “black box” into which
various versions of the facts are dumped and from which an unpredictable answer rolls out. No one
suggests that the award of damages should be taken out of the jury’s province altogether, or that
there is a need radically to overhaul theories underlying damage awards. Indeed, scholars have
shown that punitive damages are an efficient means to achieve proper deterrence.76 But excessive
damage awards have an inefficient over-deterrent effect.77 More importantly, the simple possibility
of excessive damages – whether compensatory or punitive – raises costs for litigants across the
board and affects the dynamics of settlement. This phenomenon was noted in a recent law review
article, in terms of its effect on “repeat player” defendants: “[F]or insurance companies and other
repeat litigants, a major goal (if not the major goal) in pretrial negotiations must be to avoid those
huge verdicts that inflate the mean awards.”78 Economists might deem this whole situation, instead
of a “litigation explosion,” a “verdict bubble.”
[45] Legal economists have advanced numerous theories in an attempt to arrive at an efficient
calculation of damages, concentrating on punitive damages, which, of course, are purely noneconomic damages, i.e., are not premised upon any loss to the plaintiff reducible to dollars.79 One
impediment to rationalizing the process is that jurors often encounter difficulty comprehending and
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implementing a judge’s instructions.80 A recent study has shown that even when presented with a
model (e.g., the Polinsky-Shavell model) for determining punitive damages, jurors will arrive at
“incorrect” determinations, i.e., those that are not efficient.81 Indeed, other research drawing on
psychology has shown that factors such as so-called “benchmarks,” subconsciously set in the jurors’
minds by external sources such as the media, can be just as determinative as the factors that jurors
“should” weigh to achieve an efficient outcome.82 What is most intriguing, and perhaps highly
significant, is that jurors’ abilities to weigh properly the factors that determine efficient damages
seem to vary directly with demographic variables.83 The data suggest that jury awards are not only
positively correlated to the demographic makeup of the jury, but also to other, broader
socioeconomic factors, such as the poverty rate in the community from which the venire is drawn.84
Factor in group dynamics that actually tend to increase the variability of jury awards85 with random,
cross-sectional jury selection, and the conclusion is inevitable that variability, risk, and costs all must
be higher now than in the days of the select jury.86
[46] The unpredictability and unreliability of modern jury discretion in fixing punitive damages has
been well-documented, as discussed above.87 One would certainly expect the same sort of
unpredictability and unreliability to inhere in an average jury’s ability to fix compensatory damages,
particularly in light of the fact that jurors’ accuracy in determining punitive awards is directly
correlated to their socioeconomic and educational background,88 a factor that would seem to figure
equally in a compensatory damage calculation, especially for non-economic damages, such as pain
and suffering. In such cases, juror sympathy or empathy can be played upon by a skillful plaintiff’s
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attorney like Perlman plays a fine Stradivarius. We may safely speculate that research would show
a general migration by defendants toward courts whose juries are drawn from the higher
socioeconomic strata. Indeed, removal of cases from urban state courts to federal courts (with
venires drawn from suburban and rural areas as well as from the urban area) has been noted
anecdotally as a favored tactic of the defense, as has avoidance of certain rural or depressed counties
that are “plaintiff-friendly” in terms of high-end verdicts.89 In short, the social forces that brought
about the demise of the select jury have injected an element of increased risk (flowing from
unpredictability and variability at the highest end) that, at least in the perception of some of the
users, renders the system inefficient. Obviously, there are potentially as many factors that could
account for variance in verdicts among juries hearing similar cases as there are factual differences
among cases, and we do not mean to suggest that the composition of the jury is the sole determinant
of variance and unpredictability, but it is nonetheless a very important one that must be taken into
account in explaining the lamented disappearance of the jury trial.
[47] To find anecdotal evidence that the verdict bubble is real and is not a geographically isolated
phenomenon, one need go no further than a major city’s classified telephone directory. In one such
East Coast directory, one finds advertisements for lawyers who have “won verdicts and settled cases
involving millions of dollars . . . $3.3 MILLION awarded for negligent death . . . $2.4 MILLION
awarded . . . $3.35 MILLION awarded . . . $5 MILLION awarded . . . .”90 A few pages later is an
ad for a lawyer who claims damage awards won in amounts of $10,250,000, $4,100,000,
$7,390,000, and $12,000,000, and who boasts that “juries just love him.”91 The perception of huge
jury awards as the norm – based perhaps on a factor as inherently unpredictable as a jury’s “love”
for a particularly personable lawyer – is thusly formed.
[48] As the movie Wall Street’s fictional tycoon Richard Gekko noted, “Information is the most
valuable commodity I know of.”92 This is true because it is information that drives markets to
efficiency, or inefficiency. While Miller notes, correctly, that “jury awards considered excessively
high often are reduced by the court or by the parties themselves by way of settlement, or are
reversed altogether on appeal[,]”93 the damage of unpredictable variance is done as soon as the
verdict is returned. Because these large awards form subliminal benchmarks94 for future jurors –
and the initial verdict is sure to be the front page, while its reduction, if it comes, will get one-half
column inch on page twenty-three – the verdict bubble is a self-reinforcing phenomenon. It matters
89
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not what the final outcomes of individual cases are, because the mere public perception of rising jury
awards adds momentum to the same; this creates a trickle-down effect. If plaintiffs perceive even
the slightest chance of receiving a very large verdict, the power of numbers and expected returns95
substantially raises their leverage in demanding a settlement.96 In this way, the jury’s influence
today extends beyond its immediate domain and raises costs for litigants across the board, above the
level that represents efficiency.
The Verdict
[49] Given sufficient information, markets will not tolerate inefficiencies. The modern jury trial
entails such an inefficiency. To escape the real and perceived costs of the federal jury trial, litigants
are flocking to arbitration and other forms of ADR.97 The expectation is that, there, plaintiffs will
find faster and less expensive justice and defendants will be more likely to have their “punishment
fit the crime,” thereby avoiding the “deep-pocket” phenomenon98 and optimizing the risk vs. benefit
for both sides.
[50] The inescapable fact is that, unless prohibited from doing so by law or conduct of their
adversaries, disputants will do as they please. This is not to say that traditional trials will disappear.
But there are some often-overlooked aspects to the decline in tried cases that argue for again making
the courts more attractive to litigants. Most importantly, as dispute resolution moves out of the
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courts, society is necessarily deprived of a number of cases that could advance our body of law by
adding new precedents. And, as any lawyer knows, trials as learning opportunities for junior
members of the bar are increasingly rare. Many “litigators” have garnered most of their experience
at depositions or in mock proceedings, thus diminishing the body of experiential learning, not to
mention “war stories,” which themselves play an important educational role.
[51] We have demonstrated that, like any market, the adjudication market is subject to forces beyond
the control of any single actor, but the inputs of every actor undoubtedly influence the market.
Accordingly, those who think the federal courts should retain a significant part of the adjudication
market should seriously consider making those courts more attractive. This requires the difficult
step of questioning whether the modern jury, as an exercise in pure democracy, is the appropriate
dispute-resolver for all cases, especially complex or otherwise difficult ones. Commentators have
questioned whether, for example, “it [is] fair to ask a millworker, school custodian, receptionist,
plumber, nurse’s aid [sic], housewife, and others possessing no expertise in economics or
accounting, to render an accurate verdict based on average variable cost determinations and
consequences of inventory accounting?”99 The question might just as well have been put as to
whether it makes sense to do so, a question that has been answered no in England and most other
industrialized nations.100 One answer is to return, at least in complex commercial cases,101 to a more
select jury than the “modern” one.102 Although, to be sure, any return to greater selectivity in jury
venire selection according to educational achievement or particular expertise implicates sensitive
social and, perhaps, constitutional questions,103 it has been suggested in the literature.104 If such a
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course – even given adequate safeguards against intentional, invidious discrimination – is too
politically unpalatable to be implemented, lesser measures to influence the sophistication of the
venire can surely be undertaken without objection, e.g., discontinuation of the practice of granting
automatic (whether de jure or de facto) exemptions to classes of individuals such as proprietors of
businesses, doctors, and the like.105 While we have not found any reported data, we seriously doubt
that many executive officers of Fortune 500 companies are empanelled in jury venires, let alone
actually serve as trial jurors.106
[52] The bottom line is this: Serious consideration should be given to offering appropriate
alternatives to the current jury selection process in appropriate cases if the federal courts are to
continue to present a viable choice for those shopping for dispute resolution. Otherwise, one can
reasonably expect that the decline in cases reaching trial – in favor of other forms of dispute
resolution – can, on the basis of elemental market forces, be expected to continue at its present,
fairly steady rate to some irreducible minimum, perhaps consisting mostly of suits involving
irrational litigants107 or those with nothing to lose by “rolling the dice.” The question is whether
resistance to jury reform can be overcome by those in the position – and with the determination –
to at least experiment with meaningful change.
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v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (no constitutional impediment to six member juries in civil cases).
An argument can be made, based on historical references earlier discussed in this article, that
selectivity in jury empanelment was well-accepted at the time of the Revolution. Supreme Court
case law has addressed the right to be tried in a criminal case by a jury that is fairly representative
of the community at large, see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and has held that jurors
in a civil case cannot be excluded from service on an invidious basis such as race, see Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), but it has not spoken to the constitutionality of a
“select” or “expert” jury in civil cases that involve complex issues. Of course, because the right to
trial by jury is waivable, the parties may very well, with or without a suggestion from the trial judge,
agree to a specially-qualified venire, just as they may agree to a non-Article III magistrate judge
without Constitutional impediment. Cf. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v.
Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). Finally, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that the “key man” system of jury selection is not facially unconstitutional,
most recently in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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